An Army Marches on Its Stomach
There is an issue at Fort Cavazos. Thankfully, it isn’t about sexual assault or murder (as has been the trend there for the last few years), but it is about something else seriously detrimental to morale and the wellbeing of the Soldiers stationed there. Soldiers are having difficulty getting fed. The availability of food, specifically from the dining facilities, is the actual issue.
There are a lot of different factors contributing to this problem. First, Fort Cavazos is huge. While there are a number of military chow halls (dining facilities) on the installation, many of them are not close together. If one is overly crowded, or closed, there usually isn’t another one around the corner. When you are a young Soldier who lives in the barracks, you may or may not have your own vehicle. Factor in a short timeline to eat any meal during the duty day and walking to another chow hall isn’t much of an option.
Second is the meal card system. If you aren’t familiar with meal cards, they are issued to Soldiers who live in the barracks so they can eat in the chow hall. The chow hall gets funded for each meal card swipe. The more meal cards swiped, the more funding. The more funding, the better the food. The better the food, the more people want to eat there and the more crowded it becomes. However, if you choose to eat at Burger King in the PX, that comes out of your pocket. Check the military pay scale, Soldiers don’t have a lot in their pockets to spare. The meal card doesn’t work at Burger King so some choose not to eat at all. By the way, every time a Soldier chooses to eat something other than chow hall food, that is one less swipe which means a chow hall somewhere isn’t getting credit for feeding a Soldier.
Third is the way chow halls are run. Before the reorganization of brigades in the mid-2000s, each battalion of ~500-750 Soldiers had its own dining facility. Commanders at that level (lieutenant colonel) had authority and ability to make decisions to feed their troops in ways that best suited the unit and its mission. They had flexibility and agility. After the reorganization, dining facilities (like a lot of other assets) were consolidated. Chow halls were now feeding SIX battalions and the command authority was now at the brigade commander (colonel). Gone was the flexibility and agility, along with a battalion commander’s ability to decide the best way to feed his or her Soldiers. With six battalions’ worth of cooks to support the chow hall, there were plenty of ways to keep it open but making adjustments for one of six units can be more difficult.
Last, but certainly not least, is the tempo of operations and deployments. When units deploy, their chow hall either closes or goes to reduced manning and capability. Understanding those units leave a number of Soldiers behind and they still need to eat, those Soldiers may be forced to eat at another chow hall. See the reasons above why that doesn’t work.
This isn’t a new problem. I saw this exact same situation at Fort Bragg (now Fort Liberty) back in 2012. Soldiers would look out their windows or walk up to the chow hall and see a long line. They immediately opted for Pop Tarts to Ramen in their barracks rooms. Standing in North Carolina heat and humidity only to be forced to scarf down their food so they didn’t miss formation was less than appealing. The leadership had several lengthy discussions about solving the problem. We tried different methods of serving, changed hours, and even instituted drive through windows to try to solve the problem. None of them worked well.
The one solution that would have worked was dispelled quickly. The solution was to dissolve the meal card program and pay Soldiers for their meals. You see, Soldiers that don’t live in the barracks are paid a Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) as part of their monthly pay. BAS is also referred to as “separate rations” or “separate rats” and it is the same amount of money it would cost them to eat three meals per day in the chow hall. Those Soldiers had the flexibility to eat where they wanted because they were given money to do that. You weren’t penalized for eating fast food or eating something from home because you already received the money to do so. Many of us on separate rats ate in the chow hall anyway. It was cheap, good, and (usually) close to work, plus we wanted to support our unit.
The second part of this solution is to completely contract all the dining facilities to be restaurants. Contracts can be structured to limit meal costs, offer healthy options, and provide longer hours to support the crazy schedules units sometimes keep. You can certainly count on American capitalism to ensure Soldiers will be fed well when you make it a competitive environment. It can be done.
People will question the ability and opportunity to train the cooks assigned to Army units. How can they be trained on their wartime mission if they don’t cook on a daily basis? The same way as almost every other occupational specialty in the military. You train. Commanders schedule training for their cooks, just like they do for artillery, infantry, logistics, or transportation Soldiers.
So, if the solution is that simple, why hasn’t the Army done it? Simply, it is bureaucracy. The money to run chow halls comes from one pot of money. Meal card money comes from one pot of money. “Separate rats” comes from one pot of money. These pots don’t cross over because of bureaucracy. Department of Defense can overcome this. Congress needs to implore them to do so. It takes some work to cut through the red tape. It will take time to establish contracts and reallocate funds. It will take commanders to add training for their cooks and establish the methods to do so. It will take a culture change inside the Army. But, it can be done.
By the way, if we had started this back in 2012 when we identified it on Fort Bragg, it would already be fixed and Fort Cavazos wouldn’t be in the situation it is in now.